Persons and Bodies: Constitution Without Mereology?
Zimmerman (Dean)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64.3 (May 2002), pp. 599-606
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. In "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View", Lynne Rudder Baker develops a theory of material constitution that makes no appeal to mereology.
  2. Its details are examined, some puzzles and problems are found, and ways to resolve them are suggested.
  3. Finally, counterexamples are raised that seem to require the addition of a clause about the sharing of parts.
  4. Constitution appears to be, at least in part, a mereological relation.
  5. Other papers in the Symposium are:-

Comment:

Part of Book Symposium on "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View".

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