<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Extrinsicness (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5655.htm">Personal Identity and Extrinsicness</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/G/Author_Garrett (Brian).htm">Garrett (Brian)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Philosophical Studies 59, pp. 177-194, 1990</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5655.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PapersToNotes_5655.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Author s Abstract</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>On one <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P5655_1">familiar and very broad view of personal identity</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P5655_1"></A>, the continued existence of a person over time admits of analysis in terms of relations of <em>non-branching</em> physical and/or <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>2</SUP>.1 (One version of this view is the Psychological Criterion, according to which A at t1 is identical to B at t2 iff A and B stand to each other in the relation of non-branching <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>3</SUP>.) </li><li>The need for a non-branching or no-competitors clause is occasioned by the most plausible description of the <em>division</em> or <em>fission</em> of persons, a situation in which one individual stands to each of two later individuals in qualitatively identical relations of physical and psycho logical continuity. </li><li>The inclusion of such a clause is necessary in order to avoid the consequence that the earlier person is identical to both resulting persons. The inclusion of a non-branching component in theories of personal identity over time has been thought to incur the charge of absurdity. The charge can be pressed as follows: any best-candidate theory of personal identity, which incorporates a non-branching component, violates a necessary constraint which governs our concept of strict numerical identity and - absurdly - implies, in a sense to be characterised, that the identity of a person over time can be <em>extrinsically</em> determined. Consequently, any best-candidate theory of personal identity over time is untenable. </li><li>If so, it follows that we must redescribe the transtemporal identities which hold in a case of division, e.g., along the lines suggested by <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P5655_4">Lewis, Perry and Noonan</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P5655_4"></A> (according to which the distinct post-division persons both occupy the single pre-division body), <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P5655_5"><em>or</em> else</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P5655_5"></A> give up entirely the attempt to analyse the identity of a person over time in terms of physical and/or <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>6</SUP> (and embrace instead, e.g., Cartesian dualism). However, my ultimate aim in this paper is to show how commitment to the extrinsicness of identity on the part of best-candidate theorists can be accepted without absurdity. </li></ol></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>From <a name="4"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_648.htm">Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Personal Identity (Readings)</A>".<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P5655_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P5655_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>See, e.g., Parfit's statement of the Physical and Psychological Criteria in Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 204 and p. 207. See also S. Shoemaker, 'Personal Identity: A Materialist's Account' in S. Shoemaker & R. Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984. </FONT></li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P5655_4"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P5655_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>D. Lewis, 'Survival and Identity' in A. 0. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1976; J. Perry, 'Can the Self Divide?', Journal of Philosophy, 1972; H. Noonan, 'The Closest Continuer Theory of Identity', Inquiry 28, 1985.</li></ul> </FONT><a name="On-Page_Link_P5655_5"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P5655_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>This disjunction follows on the assumption, defended below, that division is a genuine metaphysical possibility for persons. </li></ul></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T06:35" pubdate>02/08/2018 06:35:52</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>