Moral Unreason: The Case of Psychopathy
Maibom (Heidi L.)
Source: Mind and Language, Volume 20, Number 2, April 2005, pp. 237-257(21)
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Psychopaths1 are renowned for their immoral behavior. They are ideal candidates for testing the empirical plausibility of moral theories. Many think the source of their immorality is their emotional deficits. Psychopaths2 experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly rational. If this is true, sentimentalism is supported over rationalism. Here, I examine the nature of psychopathic3 practical reason and argue that it is impaired. The relevance to morality is discussed. I conclude that rationalists can explain the moral deficits of psychopaths4 as well as sentimentalists. In the process, I identify psychological structures that underpin practical rationality.

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