How to understand contextualism about vagueness: reply to Stanley
Raffman (Diana)
Source: Analysis 65.3, July 2005, pp. 244-248(5)
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    I defend contextualism about vagueness against criticisms by Jason Stanley that appear in "Context, Interest Relativity, and the Sorites1", Analysis 63, 4: 269-80. The article focuses on contextualist theories of vagueness. Philosopher Jason Stanley claims to have found a version of the sorites2 paradox that defeats so-called contextualist theories of vagueness. In this brief article, the author suggest that even if Stanley's argument works against the form of contextualism he constructs, it is not effective against contextualist accounts in general, contrary to what he seems to think. Stanley's discussion concerns the dynamic or "forced march" version of the sorites3, viz. the version framed in terms of the judgments that would be made by a competent speaker who proceeds step by step along a sorites4 series for a vague predicate.

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