Vagueness and Endurance
Lowe (E.J.)
Source: Analysis 65.2, April 2005, pp. 104-112(9)
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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. The article discusses vagueness and endurance.
  2. A number of philosophers have argued recently that perdurance1 accounts of persistence can handle problems of vagueness more satisfactorily than endurance accounts are able to, and that this is an important and perhaps even decisive consideration in their favour.
  3. The author reports on perdurantism2 chiefly because it is more familiar and more widely endorsed. The perdurantist3 says that continuant objects persist by perduring, that is, by having distinct temporal parts at different times at which they exist.
  4. The endurantist4 denies this, and typically says that such objects are "wholly present" at each time at which they exist.

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