Borowski on the Relative Identity of Persons
Puccetti (Roland)
Source: Mind, 87, No. 346, Apr., 1978, pp. 262-263
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryNotes Citing this Paper


Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. "Borowski (E.J.) - Identity and Personal Identity" (October 1976) claims that if x's brain were successfully transplanted1 into y's body, our judgment of who the survivor z really is would be relative2 to our interest in z: for example, if the body y is that of an athlete or film actor, we would say it is y if we are athletic coaches or film directors.
  2. This view completely overlooks that acting talents and athletic skills are also stored in the brain. If my brain controlled Pele's body, or Laurence Olivier's, I could not play football or act well.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 2: While Borowski does talk about logical relation of relative identity (see "Borowski (E.J.) - Diachronic Identity as Relative Identity"), this doesn’t seem to be an example of it, and “relative” is used in a different sense.


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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