|Source: Jeff McMahan - The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, 2002, Chapter 4|
|Paper - Abstract|
- Discusses abortion1, infanticide, and the infliction of prenatal injury.
- It argues that early abortion2 is morally comparable to contraception and that late abortion3 can be justified in many cases because of the comparative weakness of the fetus4's interest in continuing to live.
- The permissibility of abortion5 is not threatened either by considerations of potential or by claims about the sanctity of human life.
- Because there is no significant intrinsic difference between a late-term fetus6 and a newborn infant, infanticide can also be permissible in a limited range of cases for the same reasons that abortion7 can be justified.
- Abortion8 cannot be justified, however, by appealing to a pregnant9 woman's right of self-defense.
- Early Abortion10
- Late Abortion11
- Prenatal Harm
- Is a Later Abortion12 Worse?
- Time-Relative Interests and Adaptation
- The Sanctity of Human Life
- Abortion13 as the Denial of Life-Support
- Abortion14 and Self-Defense
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)