When Does a Life Begin?
Lockwood (Michael)
Source: Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction1 (pp. 9-14)

  1. … there are certain questions which clearly have a large philosophical component, but on the answers to which matters of great practical moment turn. One such is the question when you or I first came into existence. Hardly a week goes by, these days, without some controversial issue in medical ethics erupting into the media. The central question frequently seems to be precisely that of when a human life begins, when a human being may be said to have come into existence. The abortion issue clearly hinges, in part, on this, as do the questions whether the 'morning after' pill is ethically acceptable, or whether it is morally permissible to throw away, freeze, or squash between glass plates for the purpose of microscopic observation, a live human embryo2. Whilst it is clearly a good thing that public attention be focused on these issues, one cannot help but be struck by how little is achieved in the ensuing controversy. Not only is the discussion invariably inconclusive, it does not even seem to achieve the more modest end of clarifying the issue. It is more in the nature of a periodic muddying of already murky waters.
  2. This essay is an attempt to prove to you that careful philosophical analysis is capable of shedding considerable light on a question such as this. I shall argue that there is a right answer to the question of when a human life begins, and that philosophical reflection can make a substantial contribution to revealing what that right answer is. This, I shall argue, is an area where philosophy can be of considerable practical value, even if that is not the main reason for doing philosophy.
  3. One source of confusion in this debate is the rather careless bandying3 about of three notions which ought to be kept distinct from each other. These are the concepts of
    1. a living human organism (in the rest of this paper I shall omit 'living' but it should be understood4),
    2. a human being, and
    3. a person.
  4. For the purposes of this paper,
    • 'human organism' is to be understood in a biological sense: a human organism is simply a (complete) living organism of the species Homo sapiens.
    • 'Person', on the other hand, is not a biological concept at all. A person is a being that is conscious, in the sense of having the capacity for conscious thought and experiences, but not only that: it must have the capacity for reflective consciousness and self-consciousness. It must have, or at any rate have the ability to acquire, a concept of itself, as a being with a past and a future. Mere sentience is not enough to qualify a being as a person. But a person, in this sense, need not be human. Perhaps some non-human higher primates — chimpanzees for example — are persons in this sense; perhaps dolphins are. Probably there are persons, though not of course human persons, on planets of distant stars. Perhaps we shall one day be able to create persons artificially out of non-organic material (though it is not clear how we should know5 when we had done so; it is not behaviour that makes something a person, but rather the possession of an 'inner life' of the appropriate degree of richness and depth).
    • I shall explain in a moment just how I intend to use the term 'human being'.
  5. First, however, I want to consider two fallacious, and indeed rather crude, arguments designed to show, respectively, that you and I came into existence at the moment of conception, and, on the contrary, that we came into existence much later than that, probably subsequent to birth. I have no idea whether either of these arguments has ever been put forward in the literature, at least in such a bald form; but that doesn't matter for my purposes.
    • The first argument runs: You and I are human organisms; a human organism comes into existence at the moment of conception; therefore, we came into existence at the moment of conception.
    • The second argument runs: You and I are persons; but a foetus6 is not a person; indeed, it seems likely that several months have to elapse before the new-born baby acquires any capacity for reflective consciousness or self-consciousness; therefore, it seems likely that we did not come into existence until some time after birth.
    Both arguments are unsound.
  6. The first is valid, but its premiss is false. You and I are not7 human organisms. Consider the human organism corresponding to some given human being8. If that human being were the very same thing as that organism, he would not only come into existence at the same time as the organism; he would also cease to exist at the same time as the organism ceased to exist. But hardly any reflective person believes this to be the case, at any rate invariably.
    • Those who believe in the existence of an immortal soul do not believe this, because they believe that we continue to exist, even when the corresponding human organisms die, decay, and turn to dust.
    • But those who do not believe in an immortal soul mostly do not believe either that the time at which a human being ceases to exist is necessarily the same as the time at which the corresponding organism dies. (I am assuming9 that a living human organism ceases to exist when it dies, so that a corpse is merely the remains of such an organism.) This is because most people are prepared to accept the concept of brain death10. That is to say, most people accept that certain sorts of brain damage would constitute the end of our (mortal) existence, even if they did not prevent the continuation of such lower brain functions as are necessary to maintain respiration, circulation, and so forth. Suitable destruction of higher brain centres, coupled with the maintenance of such lower functions, would in most people's eyes mean that the living human organism remained, even though we11 were no more. That12 view now enjoys the status of scientifically educated common sense13. I shall nevertheless attempt shortly14 to give a philosophical justification for it.
  7. The second argument fails for quite different reasons.
    • Its premiss is true, but not in such a sense as to support the conclusion drawn. Or at least, it has not been shown that it is true in the required sense.
    • Consider the following parody of the argument: I am a philosopher; but the individual bearing my name in 1954 was not a philosopher; therefore, I did not exist in 1954.
    • The point is that 'philosopher' is what is known as a 'phase15 sortal16': one and the same individual can be a philosopher at one time yet not be a philosopher at another earlier or later time.
    • There are, on the other hand, some things which an object is, if at all, for the entire period of its existence, things which it cannot become or cease to be; we may call these temporally essential attributes. The property of being a building is in this sense temporally essential. You can reduce a building to a pile of rubble; but then the building no longer exists. Likewise, the building did not itself exist when the bricks of which it was composed had not yet been assembled. To cease to be a building17 is, for a building, to cease to be.
    • Is personhood a temporally essential attribute of you or me? Personhood, that is to say, as I stipulatively defined it above. If it were, the second of our two arguments would be valid. Could I cease to be a person without ceasing to be? It seems pretty clear to me that I could.
    • I want you to engage in the following thought experiment18. Suppose that you knew that you were going to suffer from a terrible disease, which would slowly extinguish your mental capacity for reflective consciousness or self-consciousness — those attributes that mark us off from at any rate most lower animals. But imagine that this disease still left the organism capable of sentience: it would still be aware, still be capable of experiencing sounds, colours, pleasure and pain, and so forth. Only higher cognitive functions would have gone. Now suppose this being were to be subjected to the most excruciating pain19 imaginable for some extended period. If you knew that it was going to be you that suffered the disease, and that it would be the brain you now possess, albeit pathetically reduced in cognitive capacity, whose pain centres were going to be stimulated, what would your attitude be towards the pain? Would you consider that it was going to happen to you? Would you deem it rational to fear this pain in a self-interested way? Or would you think of it as something that was going to happen to someone or something that was not, after all, you? So that, at most, you would view the prospect of this pain as you would view the prospect of it happening to a dog, say, of whom you were fond.
    • If you think, as I do, that it would be rational to fear this pain in a self-interested way, then you will be forced to conclude that being a person is not20 a temporally essential attribute but merely a phase sortal21. I could cease to be a person and yet still exist; and if so, then by the same token, it makes perfectly good sense to say that I did exist before I became a person, just as I existed before I became an adult, and existed before I became a philosopher.
    • Some may disagree with this view. Some of you may think that it is not rational to fear the pain, in the example just given, as something that would be happening to you.
    • All well and good: my point at the moment is just that it would not be absurd for someone to take the opposite view. If being a person is indeed a temporally essential attribute, that needs to be argued22 for; it is not obviously so, if indeed it is so at all.
  8. One further point; some philosophers might accept that 'person' is merely a phase sortal23, and that we existed, you and I, before we achieved personhood. Yet they might still insist that it is only when one becomes a person that one comes to have a serious right to life. If this human organism had been painlessly killed at birth then – a fortiori – I would have been killed, on this view. But, assuming that this did not violate anyone else's rights (for example, the mother's), that wouldn't have been a (seriously) wrong thing to do. That is a possible24 view. I shall have something to say about it later25. At the moment, however, I am concerned not with the ethical issues, but rather with a substantive non-ethical philosophical question — albeit one that is widely thought to have important ethical implications.
  9. The above discussion reveals that we need a term for whatever it is that you and I are essentially26, what we can neither become nor cease to be, without ceasing to exist. I use the term human being to fill this slot. Some might think conscious being a better term: on the grounds that one could perhaps turn into a frog27 without ceasing to exist, but would then hardly be a human being, or on the grounds that the souls of the departed, if such there be, have ceased to be human beings without ceasing to be, or that Pinocchio existed, as a conscious being, before he became human. On this view, 'human being' means a conscious being with a human body: and since in principle one could acquire or cease to possess a human body without ceasing to be, 'human being' is really just a phase28 sortal29. Perhaps30. But I shall ignore these niceties; there is a point beyond which pedantry31 ceases to be profitable.
  10. We have thus refined our question; it is the question 'When does a human being come into existence?' And we have seen this to be a different question from that of when a human organism comes into existence or when personhood is attained. How are we to set about answering this question? Well there is one thing that seems to me now quite obvious, something that should be obvious to anyone with a philosophical training, though I have never heard any philosopher say it; and indeed, it only occurred to me relatively recently. It is this; The question of when a human being comes into existence is really the same question as that of what constitutes the identity of a human being over time; the so-called problem of personal identity. And this is something about which philosophers, at least since Locke, have had a very great deal to say. Perhaps I'm exaggerating a little in saying that they're the same question. What I mean is this; If one was able to answer the familiar philosophical question; 'What is it that makes someone at one time the very same human being as someone at another time?', then one would be able also to answer the question 'What has to happen for a human being to have come into existence in the first place?' (What has to happen at or after conception, that is.) To answer the first question, one would have to stipulate32 some relationship that has to hold between human beings considered at two given times if they are to be the same human being. But if one knew that, one would be able to answer the second question as follows; Any given human being, a, considered at a time t, may be said to have come into existence at the earliest time t' at which there is an individual b that stands to a in the appropriate relationship. Briefly, if I know what relationship is constitutive of my identity through time, then I know that I came into existence at the33 moment when there first existed something that stands in that relationship to me now.

Notes (on pp. 15-3134)
  1. So, just what “relationship is constitutive of my identity through time”?
  2. Lockwood considers Locke’s35 account of PID, noting his term “man” for “human organism”, as distinct from “person”, but rejects it (as Reid did) as non-transitive. He considers ways of patching it up:-
    • Firstly, he considers Parfit’s36 non-transitive relation of Survival37. He thinks this is more relevant to cases of fission.
    • Secondly, the ancestral38 of Locke’s memory-relation.
  3. But he considers both to be failures on account of the case of total amnesia, as explained in the next bullet ...
  4. We get a second dose of the FGPT – exactly as in Williams.If I’m told that I’m going to be horribly tortured, being told that I’m going to have all my memories erased beforehand39 will be no comfort.
  5. He thinks that philosophers have mistakenly tried to define what (as he says) identity over time is for human beings, whereas he thinks there is a fact of the matter.
  6. He asks us to consider two TEs:-
    • WBTs40: if you were suffering from a brain-tumour you’d not consider it recovery to be given someone else’s brain41, but a speedier death42. The brain-donor would have received a body-transplant43.
    • Teletransportation44: In the case where your body is destroyed when scanned, this isn’t a quick form of travel but rather an unusual form of suicide45. The teletransported46 “you” is only qualitatively (rather than numerically) identical to you. He thinks this is true intuitively – fakes are fakes, copies are copies – but is proved to be duplication by the case47 where the scan does not destroy your body. He just dismisses the idea that here we have a case of fission as “desperately implausible48”.
  7. So, Locke’s psychological relation is neither necessary (total amnesia) nor sufficient (teletransportation) for PID49.
  8. What Lockwood concludes50 is that “a human being cannot be me unless he has my brain” – that very brain I was born with (or at least a crucial part51 of it), not a qualitatively indistinguishable52 one.
  9. Now (mid-p. 19 ff.), and in the rest of the paper, Lockwood makes various ethical deductions from this conclusion.
  10. Basically, cateris paribus, you can do what you like53 with the fetus54 prior to the development of a brain, as if I’m individuated by my brain, then a brainless fetus55 cannot be me, or anyone else. It is (by Lockwood’s definition) not a human being.
  11. Lockwood makes the strong claim that – while the early fetus56 has the potential to be a human being – this potential is “equally true” of the sperm and unfertilised ovum. He asks us to imagine the situation where a particular egg and cell are about to fertilise, but are prevented. This is an important57 claim, followed up with the further one that nothing changes morally or metaphysically from pre-conception until the brain has developed.
  12. Lockwood claims that (what he calls) the criterion of brain life has since the mid-1960s58 increasingly been taken to form the basis for deciding when the human being comes into existence, just as brain death59 marks the end.
  13. But he claims in a footnote that a certain understanding of brain death60 spoils that analogy with brain life.
    • This is the claim made, inter alia by "Glover (Jonathan) - Causing Death and Saving Lives", which says that it’s the lack of a future capacity for higher mental function that signals the loss of moral status of the individual. But this spoils the analogy with the status of the early fetus61 for, while it presently has no capacity for higher mentation, it has the capacity normally to acquire it; and, so, on this account there should be no more justification for terminating the fetus62 than for removing support for someone in a temporary coma.
    • Lockwood also objects to “brain-stem death” as the indicator of brain-death, as – for him – it’s not the cessation of the basic life-functions that signals the death of the human being (as distinct from the human animal)63 but the irrevocable cessation of higher mental function.
    • There is a contingent relation between the death of the brain-stem and the death of the cortex, but presumably this might not be so, and if it were possible to maintain the body alive post brain-stem death with the higher mental functions fundamentally intact, then (for Lockwood, and probably for most people) the human individual would not be deemed to have died.
    • Lockwood thinks that death of the brain-stem is chosen clinically over the (for him) more logical cortex as a diagnostic for the death of the latter isn’t so easily available – as people have been known to recover from fat EEGs when the brain-stem was still functional, whereas the reverse is never the case, albeit contingently so.
  14. Lockwood now addresses the objection that conceptual analysis reveals that what we mean when we talk of personal identity is not a reference to the brain, which might imply that our brains cannot be essential to our identity. Aristotle (presumably) had the same concept of personal identity as ourselves, yet (famously) thought of the brain as a blood-cooler. Many contemporaries think the human being (or at least the conscious being) survives the death of the body. On the other hand, while some philosophers think that materialism is a conceptual truth, they have never made a plausible case.
  15. Also, we have no difficulty understanding the science-fiction TEs involving body swapping64.
  16. So65, “… even materialistically-minded philosophers have, for the most part, resisted accounts of personal identity that make essential appeal to what is really just a matter of scientific theory.
  17. Lockwood points out that the questions “what does X mean” and “what does X consist in” are entirely different, and knowing the answer to one doesn’t mean we know the answer to the other.
  18. He uses as an analogy Kripke’s example of “gold” in "Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Lecture III", pp. 116-144; as also pointed out by Mackie in "Mackie (J.L.) - Problems from Locke" ("Mackie (J.L.) - Personal Identity", pp. 199-203); we are also referred to "Putnam (Hilary) - Meaning and Reference". What we mean by “gold” (heavy yellow metal, etc) is not the same as what gold consists in (element of atomic number 79, or whatever its underlying nature might have been found to be).
  19. The underlying nature of a substance66 explains (or promises to explain) why it has the manifest properties it does. It might even explain why something (in exceptional circumstances) without the manifest properties usually associated with that substance is in fact just that.
  20. The point of all this is that Lockwood (and those cited) make an analogy between the discovery of the real nature of gold with that of personal identity. Human beings are not defined in terms of the various psychological properties that are commonly associated with them. Rather, these properties are a manifestation of something underlying them. What this underlying substrate might be is left open by the meaning of the words associated with personal identity.
  21. So, it is a priori possible that what underlies the discernible properties of psychological continuity67 is an immaterial soul – though Lockwood thinks68 there’s “not the slightest reason” for believing so. Rather, Lockwood thinks the scientific evidence favours “continuity of physical organisation within some part or parts of a living human brain69…”.
  22. Lockwood has an important footnote (N18) on neural organisation as against function70. So, provided the structures are there, we have (according to Lockwood) a human being, even if (as may be the case for the early fetus)71 it’s in a coma or dreamless sleep.
  23. Lockwood asks whether Karen Quinlan – Link – (was) dead. This would depend on whether the neural structures that are constitutive of her being a human being still existed. If they did, then she could (have been) woken up – even if the powers so to do were (then) unknown; otherwise she would (have been) dead72.
  24. So, Lockwood thinks all this confirms his earlier tentative conclusion that I live only as long as the relevant part of my brain remains intact, and come into existence when this does.
  25. Precisely when is a matter for scientific research. In a footnote (N19), Lockwood concludes that this indicates somewhere between 8 and 18 weeks. He repudiates the import of fetal thumb-sucking so beloved of the anti-abortion lobby.
  26. He doubts – even given the continued advance of science – whether there’s any fact of the matter to be discovered as to precisely when a human being comes into existence, as the concept73 “human being” is not completely precise. Thus, “human life” isn’t precise, either. Even so, the concept is not so vague that “anything goes”.
  27. Lockwood now proceeds to ethical74 matters. While we cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”, he thinks most people would find it wrong to kill an innocent human being75 – and he’d go further and ascribe wrongness to killing any sentient being, the degree of wrongness being proportional to the degree of sentience, cateris paribus.
  28. Lockwood thinks that it’s OK to do what we like with “pre-human” embryos76 provided – importantly – that we don’t let them develop into handicapped human beings.
  29. On the abortion debate, Lockwood agrees with Hare77 that there’s a limit to the degree of self-sacrifice that “can reasonably be demanded of someone in the name of duty”, and this will allow abortion of human beings where too much would be asked of the mother, and we’re referred to a “celebrated” article - "Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - A Defense of Abortion". Basically, he’s supportive of abortion “on demand” up to 1078 weeks, but with more stringent conditions thereafter. He thinks it’s “morally indefensible” to abort a healthy fetus79 that could be born alive.
  30. An alternative moral starting point: some philosophers – eg. "Tooley (Michael) - Abortion and Infanticide" and Singer80 (“Killing Humans and Killing Animals”) claim that only persons have a “serious right” to life – because they (only) have a strong desire to go on living, and have other desires for which life is a prerequisite. But even those who – strictly speaking – do not have a desire for continued living, might still have an interest in it. Lockwood’s example for distinguishing desire from interest is children’s education, which they might not want, but in which they have “an interest”, in that it would be contrary to their interests not to have one. So, a human being with the potential to become a person has a very strong interest in being allowed to develop into one.
  31. We end up with a scale – it’s worse to kill those with a preference than those merely with an interest, and in turn worse to kill these than those without. Those with an interest have more to lose – if only prospectively – but the mother has a present preference (one may assume) so can take precedence over a fetus81 that hasn’t.
  32. We have the strong intuition that the Inca practice of sacrificing adolescent girls is worse than the Greek practice of infanticide, yet many philosophers – including Singer, Tooley, Glover and Hare – have embraced the counter-intuitive conclusion that early infanticide is no worse than contraception, on the grounds that neither actually possesses the attributes that mark off human beings from the “lower” animals.
  33. There’s an allusion to “Leonard Arthur” and the legitimate killing82 of a Down’s syndrome infant – as compared with the “unconscionable” killing of a 16-year-old (“unless83 it enjoyed a level of consciousness no higher than that of a dog”).
  34. What about “potential” – which both “sperm+ovum” and the new-born have? It seems that if we count potential, then neither contraception nor infanticide are permissible, whereas if we don’t, neither are. In fact, only Tooley takes this extreme view, the others add utilitarian riders. Glover considers new-borns – like foetuses84 – to be “replaceable” – so that just as correct (he says) to replace a “defective” new-born with a fully-functioning baby you’d not otherwise have had as it is to delay conception to avoid a defective fetus85 being conceived.
  35. Lockwood hopes that his account provides a common-sense middle ground between these “all or nothing” extremes. There’s “potentiality and potentiality”. The new-born child and the late fetus86 have an interest in their potential to become a person coming to fruition. However, the sperm+ovum (says Lockwood) does not have the potential ever to be a person, because (says Lockwood) the sperm+ovum is not a human being (nor is the early fetus)87. At least the potential is only “oblique”. The reason for this (for Lockwood) is that persons are not identical to human organisms. Even a mature human organism does not have interests – only the human being does. We were never sperm+ovum, nor week-old embryos88.
  36. Postscript:
    • Lockwood insists that the key issue in whether an earlier being has an interest in the happiness of a later being is that it be “the very same being”. That, coupled with the claims that only beings with interests are the proper subjects of moral concern, and that human identity consists in the continuous existence of the same functioning brain, leads to the conclusion that early human embryos89 are not the proper subjects of moral concern.
    • That was his take in October 1983, and he’s sticking to it. It allows experimentation on human embryos90 before they become (by Lockwood’s definition) human beings91, but what’s wrong with experimenting on them (for some time) after the point at which (for Lockwood) human life begins?
    • Lockwood would impose 4 rules:-
      1. No deliberate rearing of embryos92 for experimentation (by-products are OK),
      2. The embryo93 is “not viable – there is no possibility of it surviving to term”,
      3. No suffering should be caused,
      4. No long or short term deleterious consequences for others.
    • If these provisos94 are met, Lockwood thinks that residual objections would have to be based on whether experimenting would be against the interests of the embryo95 / fetus96.
    • A consequentialist might find difficulty understanding the objections, if a human being’s interests are defined solely in terms of its quality of life (none) or satisfaction of its desires (none), but a Kantian would – rightly – think that the embryo97 was not being treated as “an end in itself”, as it has not given consent.
    • Lockwood thinks the Kantian objection carries no weight. His objection rests on the (obscure) non-viability98 condition. If we’d be happy to experiment on a non-human embryo99 satisfying these conditions, then any objection to experimenting on a human embryo100 would be speciesist. That would be irrational, though there might be “thin end of the wedge” considerations.
    • Finally, Lockwood considers the justification for his first proviso, glossed101 as “allowing the embryo102 to continue living until it becomes a human being with the deliberate intention of experimenting on it”. His objection is that death is a misfortune, and allowing an individual to come into existence and then killing it is to bring a misfortune upon it. And if it’s objected that the fetus103 had no prospect of a worthwhile life anyway, then that itself is a misfortune.
    • The last sentence of the paper deserves quoting in full: “But if a human embryo104 once had the potential for worthwhile life, then it may be wrong to allow it to develop to the point at which there is a human being who, though no longer viable, could be regarded as having a strong retrospective interest in one’s not having allowed that opportunity for worthwhile life to slip away.” Just what is the experimenter supposed to have done or not done to make the fetus105 non-viable, or to allow to become so?

Comment:

Photocopy filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 09 (L)".



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Footnote 3: Lockwood’s intentions are to be applauded, but I’m not convinced that his definition of “human being” is coherent.

Footnote 4: Aren’t organisms living by definition? When they die, they are “former” organisms, but are no longer organisms as they don’t perform the functions of an organism.

Footnote 5: This goes beyond the “Turing Test” (Link), which is a test for intelligence (strictly “thinking”) rather than for conscious awareness.

Footnote 7: That’s animalism overthrown then! Naturally, the argument for this claim is itself unsound.

Footnote 8: Footnote 9: I, and Olson, agree, though Feldman would not!

Footnote 11: Footnote 12: Footnote 13: Quoted by "Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity", p. 12. Olson takes it that “the view” in the previous footnote is that “you” don’t survive if you fall into a PVS.

Footnote 14: Good – watch out for this!

Footnote 15: The idea that human persons are phase sortals of human beings seems to have more of a track record than I had thought!

Footnote 17: Footnote 19: This is Bernard Williams’s FGPT (Click here for Note), as Lockwood acknowledges with a reference to "Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future".

Footnote 20: I agree with this argument.

Footnote 22: That we are essentially persons is – of course – argued for at length in "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View", etc.

Footnote 24: Maybe, but if your philosophy allows you to perform abominable acts (infanticide, considered as “not seriously wrong”) then you are in need of a reality check (like being locked up).

Footnote 25: Ensure this is indeed followed up.

Footnote 26: Footnote 27: For Metamorphosis - Click here for Note. The idea that the very same individual could belong to different natural kinds at different stages of its existence is very doubtful.

Footnote 28: Well, isn’t this the case on Lockwood’s own account, with a “human being” being a phase sortal of a “human organism”?

Footnote 30: Is this similar to the Constitution View? Except, it’s not clear what I might be that is variously constituted, given that (according to Lockwood) I’m not essentially a person (as the holders of the CV claim).

Footnote 31: Why is this pedantry – we’re not just arguing over words.

Footnote 32: Surely, this relationship ought to be discovered, not “stipulated”.

Footnote 33: Footnote 34: Notes on the Introduction (pp. 9-14) appear as Footnotes to the above Text.

Footnote 36: We are referred to "Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity".

Footnote 38: Lockwood attributes this – as a suggestion rather than an endorsement – to Ayer in "Ayer (A.J.) - The Problem of Knowledge" and "Ayer (A.J.) - The Concept of a Person".

Footnote 39: Nor, I think, would having them erased afterwards so that I’d remember nothing of the period of torture.

Footnote 41: Footnote 42: Footnote 45: Footnote 46: Footnote 47: Parfit’s “branch-line” case.

Footnote 48: But he gives no reasons for this. It is intelligible given a 4D account of persistence.

Footnote 49: But he doesn’t go as far as Olson (and maybe other animalists) and declare psychology “irrelevant”.

Footnote 50: This seems a bit premature, but he provides some justification later.

Footnote 51: He doesn’t say which part, but it’s presumably enough to allow sentience, but not higher cognitive powers.

Footnote 52: Eg. one that has been teletransported.

Footnote 53: Footnote 57: Footnote 58: We are referred to his N20, which itself points out that (to his surprise) his “brain life” approach had been posited by various Catholic writers over the then past 20 years, though not always with the logical conclusion concerning early abortion.

Footnote 64: Footnote 65: Footnote 66: Lockwood doesn’t use the term “substance”.

Footnote 68: And I agree!

Footnote 69: And I agree with that, too. But what does this fact say about us? Are we, then, brains?

Footnote 70: By which he means functioning, rather than anything to do with functionalism.

Footnote 72: Footnote 73: Footnote 74: As these aren’t central to my concerns, I’ve not followed up on every point in this part of the essay.

Footnote 75: We need to watch out for what’s meant here, as Lockwood uses the term “human being” in his own sense, but our moral sensibilities are based on its common usage – though I suspect they are governed by “paradigm cases” rather than those on the margins.

Footnote 77: In "Hare (R.M.) - Moral Thinking - Its Levels, Method and Point".

Footnote 78: There’s a (mildly) interesting note to the effect that “10 weeks” is from the last menstruation, and since ovulation is mid-cycle, this equates to a fetal age of 8 weeks

Footnote 80: Footnote 82: Footnote 83: This is all rather scary.

Footnote 91: Footnote 94: Lots of comments could be made here, but (i) seems arbitrarily prescriptive, and (ii) and (iv) are vague.

Footnote 98: Footnote 101: Well, nearly – these are my words, hopefully giving Lockwood’s sense.


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