Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity
Rea (Michael) & Silver (David)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, No. 1, Jul., 2000, pp. 185-193
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    In a recent article, Trenton Merricks argues that psychological continuity1 analyses (PC-analyses) of personal identity over time are incompatible with endurantism2. We contend that if Merricks's argument is valid, a parallel argument establishes that PC-analyses of personal identity are incompatible with perdurantism; hence, the correct conclusion to draw is simply that such analyses are all necessarily false. However, we also show that there is good reason to doubt that Merricks's argument is valid.

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