What are Physical Objects?
Markosian (Ned)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, No. 2, Sep., 2000, pp. 375-395
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Philosophers Index Abstract

    I consider several attempts at answering the question What are physical objects?, and give my reasons for preferring one of them over its rivals. The account that I defend--the spatial location account--defines physical objects as objects with spatial locations. The intuitive idea is this. Objects from all of the different ontological categories--physical objects; nonphysical objects like souls, if there are any; propositions; universals1; etc.--have this much in common: they all exist in time. But not all of them exist in space. The ones that exist in time and space, i.e., the ones that have spatial locations, are the ones that count as physical objects.

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