Cross-Modality and the Self
Ganeri (Jonardon)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, No. 3, Nov., 2000, pp. 639-657
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    The thesis of this paper is that the capacity to think of one's perceptions as cross-modally integrated is incompatible with a reductionist account of the self. In section 2, I distinguish three versions of the argument from cross-modality1. According to the 'unification' version of the argument, what needs to be explained is one's capacity to identify an object touched as the same as an object simultaneously seen. According to the 'recognition' version, what needs to be explained is one's capacity, having once seen an object, to reidentify that same object by touch alone. According to the 'objectivity' version, what needs to be explained is one's capacity to think of one's perceptions in different modalities as perceptions of one and the same object. (edited)

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