Remembering the Past of Another
Puccetti (Roland)
Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2 (4), June 1973: 523-532.
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer


Philosophers Index Abstract

    Would replacing someone's childhood memories with those accumulated by someone else result in his remembering the past of another, or in changing his personal history? those who say the latter interpretation is unreasonable must hold to bodily identity as a necessary condition of personal identity, and deny that memory is a sufficient condition. This hardly squares with the admission that brain transplantation1 yields the same person with a new body. However, there are limits to a defence of memory as constitutive of identity.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Oct 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page