The Crucial Relation in Personal Identity
Kitcher (Patricia)
Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, VIII, March 1978, pp. 131-145
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. This article offers a new approach to the traditional question of what makes someone the same person through time.
  2. I argue that it is relevant to consider the purposes served by regarding the world as including continuing persons.
  3. Using this method, I argue for two conclusions.
    1. The first is that memory alone cannot be the relation that is crucial to personal identity.
    2. Secondly, I argue that there is considerable evidence to support the view that a broader type of psychological continuity1 is the most important relation for the identity of persons through time.

  1. What is the Problem of Personal Identity?
  2. An Attempted Solution: Memory Continuity;
  3. Psychological Continuity2 and Personal Identity

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