Adverbs, Identity, and Multiple Personalities
MacIntosh (J.J.)
Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 22, 1992: 301-321
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsDisclaimer


Philosophers Index Abstract

    We have conflicting intuitions about personal identity. In a host of actual and envisaged cases we are tempted to say, often for strong moral reasons, "same human being", but a "different person". However a straight- forward reading of Leibniz's Law1 suggests that "same human being" entails "same person", if what we are dealing with is a person at all. In this paper I offer a non-Davidsonian adverbial analysis of attributions and argue that such an analysis eliminates the apparent conflict between morality and logic.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Sept 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page