Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism |
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Burke (Michael) |
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, 34 (4), 1997: 457-467 |
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The thesis of the article is that accepting a psychological criterion1 of personal identity is not incompatible with identifying persons with their bodies. One problem addressed is that of avoiding nested persons, of explaining why heads and other brain-containing parts of persons do not qualify as persons themselves.
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