Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism
Burke (Michael)
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, 34 (4), 1997: 457-467
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

The thesis of the article is that accepting a psychological criterion1 of personal identity is not incompatible with identifying persons with their bodies. One problem addressed is that of avoiding nested persons, of explaining why heads and other brain-containing parts of persons do not qualify as persons themselves.

  1. Introduction;
  2. The Two-Thinkers Objection;
  3. The Relation between Human Persons and Their Bodies

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - July 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page