Logically Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Identity through Time
Nelson (Jack)
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, 9(2), 1972, pp. 177-185
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Leibniz's law1 and the identity of indiscernibles2 principle together yield a necessary and sufficient condition for identity, but one which is so general as to be almost useless. It is commonly thought that there must also be more specific conditions for identity, e.G., For the identity of material objects through time. It is argued that this is not the case, at least as regards material objects, since any such condition would have to rely on the relation of spatio-temporal continuity and that relation cannot be explicated in any useable way.

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