Supervenience and Co-Location
Rea (Michael)
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, 34(3), July 1997: 367-375
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    It is widely believed that many (if not all) of the intrinsic qualitative properties of macrophysical objects supervene1 on the intrinsic properties and relations exemplified by its microphysical parts. An object's mass and shape seem to supervene2 in this way; its mental properties (if it has any) and its sortal3 properties seem to as well. If this is so, however, then, as several philosophers have pointed out, the possibility of collocation--the possibility of more than one material object filling the same region of space at the same time--raises a host of problems. My aim in this paper is to show how the collocationist can overcome these problems.

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