- According to an old and attractive view, vagueness must be eliminated before semantic notions (truth, implication, and so on) may be applied. This view — call it semantic nihilism — was accepted by Frege, but is rarely defended nowadays. This recent neglect is unjustified: the thorny nest of problems surrounding vagueness is best untangled by accepting something like the old Fregean view.
- If semantic notions such as truth apply only to completely precise sentences, they do not apply to English or any other natural language. Thus, almost no English sentences are true (or false). We defend this seemingly radical and self-refuting conclusion by developing a theory of how vagueness is typically and harmlessly ignored.
- Section one sets out semantic nihilism. Section two argues for its superiority to the structurally similar theory of supervaluationism. Section three concerns truth.
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