Brain Transplants and Personal Identity
Puccetti (Roland)
Source: Analysis 29.3, 1969, pp. 65-77
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The purpose of this paper is to consider what consequences for personal identity would ensue from transplantation1 of a functioning human brain from one body to another. It is claimed that in fact, 'where goes a brain there goes a person', so that those philosophers who have claimed bodily continuity or identity is either a necessary or even a sufficient condition of personal identity are flatly wrong. This holds true even when the transplant2 occurs between bodies of different sexes. It is also shown, as a further argument against corporealism, that one could create two distinct persons in a single body. Chief scientific sources are from R.W. Sperry and associates. Method used is analytical. Conclusion is that the brain is the physical basis of a human person, not the body as a whole.

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