|Mr. Brennan on Person's Brains|
|Source: Analysis 31.1, 1970, pp. 30-32|
|Paper - Abstract|
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Philosophers Index Abstract
This is a reply to Andrew Brennan's criticism of the thesis that if you transplant1 person x's brain into person y's former body the resulting composite organism will still be x in terms of personal identity. It argues, first, that it is necessary to distinguish the brain from the body in order to describe the operation; second, that successive retransplantation2 of the same brain involves passing a person from body to body; third, that even in an accidental father-daughter exchange of brains the old personal relationship could be retained though the bodies are now inappropriate to it; and fourth, that for a new person to result from brain transplantation3 in the "strong" sense of "new person", all the former memories, character traits, etc. Would have to be artificially replaced by new ones through brain surgery, which just emphasizes the point that the brain is the physical basis of personality.
Response to "Brennan (Andrew) - Persons and their Brains"
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