Coinciding Objects: In Defence of the ‘Standard Account’
Lowe (E.J.)
Source: Analysis 55.3, July 1995, pp. 171-178
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. Michael Burke has recently argued against what he calls the 'standard account' of relations between objects falling under different sortals1, according to which numerically distinct objects can exist in the same place at the same time, such as a statue2 and the piece of copper composing it.
  2. Burke resists this by refusing to identify the piece of copper composing the statue3 with the piece of copper which preexisted that statue4.
  3. However, his position is shown to have counterintuitive consequences.


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