Problems of Reductive Personalism
Berglund (Stefan)
Source: Berglund - Human and Personal Identity (PhD Dissertation, Lund University), Chapter 6, 1995, pp. 128-158
Paper - Abstract

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  1. Neo-Lockean Notions
    → 1.1 Butler's Circularity Argument
    → 1.2 The Notion of Quasi-memory1
    → 1.3 Arguments Against Quasi-memory2
  2. Duplication and Branching
    → 2.1 Commissurotomy3 and Split-brain
    → 2.2 The Reduplication Argument4
    → 2.3 The Non-Branching Clause and the Multiple Occupancy Thesis
  3. Against Thought Experiments5
  4. The Multiple Personality Disorder6
  5. The Two Lives Argument
  6. The Weaknesses of Reductive Personalism


Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 02 (B1: Ba - Be)".

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