Problems of Reductive Personalism
Berglund (Stefan)
Source: Berglund - Human and Personal Identity (PhD Dissertation, Lund University), Chapter 6, 1995, pp. 128-158
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryNotes Citing this Paper


Sections

  1. Neo-Lockean Notions
    … 1.1 Butler's Circularity Argument
    … 1.2 The Notion of Quasi-memory
    … 1.3 Arguments Against Quasi-memory
  2. Duplication and Branching
    … 2.1 Commissurotomy and Split-brain
    … 2.2 The Reduplication Argument
    … 2.3 The Non-Branching Clause and the Multiple Occupancy Thesis
  3. Against Thought Experiments
  4. The Multiple Personality Disorder
  5. The Two Lives Argument
  6. The Weaknesses of Reductive Personalism

Comment:

Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 02 (B1: Ba - Be)".

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