Multiple Identity
Puccetti (Roland)
Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 54.3, 1973, 203-215
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The Wiggins-Parfit1 paradigm case of multiple personal identity can be represented as follows: if b's left cerebral hemisphere is transplanted2 into another body to make the composite organism b(a), and the right one into another body to make b(b), would not b(a) and b(b) be the same person? But brain-bisected humans show functional independence of the deconnected hemispheres, indicating b is a compound of two hemisphere-based persons to begin with. There is then no need to give up the language of identity, as Parfit3 has urged, and indeed one can find good reasons why we should not.

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