The 'Only T1 Through T2' Principle
Ehring (Douglas)
Source: Analysis 49, 1989, 176-177
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    I argue that Humean and neo-Humean theories of causation1 are incompatible with a causal theory of identity. Whether two object stages are stages of the same object does not depend upon any event which occurs after the time of the occurrence of those two stages. But on a Humean or neo-Humean theory of causation2, whether two stages are causally connected will depend upon how the world unfolds "after" those stages occur.

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