Supervenience and Action
Alexander (Ronald)
Source: Alexander (Ronald) - The Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity, 1997, Chapter 5
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryBooks / Papers Citing this Paper


Author’s Abstract1

  1. In Chapter V, I try to make a case, again relying upon portions of the body-mind literature, for the self’s role in the causal process of intention and action - a process we understand as taking place within a physical context.
  2. Chapter V focuses on the problem of how the self can be an abstract particular and still have causal efficacy.

Comment:

Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 01 (A)".



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Alexander (Ronald) - The Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity: Introduction", p. 3.


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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