The Self, Time, and the Community
Alexander (Ronald)
Source: Alexander (Ronald) - The Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity, 1997, Chapter 6
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract1

  1. In Chapter VI, I try to show how the person is temporal through and through and how an existentialistic or phenomenological analysis of time must be taken into consideration in respect to the problem of personal identity.
  2. As the theme progresses in Chapter VI, it becomes clear that the temporality of the self is not simply a private or individualistic matter. Rather, the self of the person does not arise solely from the individual but is also a product of the individual's interchange with society. Temporality and community are not separable components of personhood because the 'role' one plays out in his/her life (temporality) is in large measure a role provided by the community.
  3. G. H. Mead's work in respect to the social construction of the self is very helpful here if it is supplemented with a Sartrean understanding of consciousness.

Comment:

Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 01 (A)".



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Alexander (Ronald) - The Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity: Introduction", pp. 3-4.


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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