Consciousness and the Self
Alexander (Ronald)
Source: Alexander (Ronald) - The Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity, 1997, Chapter 8
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract1

  1. In Chapter VIII, the relationship between the self and consciousness is explored. These two features of the person are not identical in function.
  2. Again, Mead and Sartre are very helpful in the examination of this relationship. Sartre's view of consciousness is an improvement upon Mead's even though the latter's position on the role of society in respect to the self is more helpful than Sartre's.
  3. I conclude the chapter with a brief look at Robert Nozick's analysis of the self’s 'self-synthesis'. Much of what Nozick has to say in this regard is instructive and supportive of my view of the self as a supervenient trope, but unfortunately he backs off from endorsing this approach. I think that he would have been more supportive of this concept of self if he had kept separate the functions of self and consciousness, and if he had treated universals as abstract particulars.

Comment:

Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 01 (A)".



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Alexander (Ronald) - The Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity: Introduction", p. 4.


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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