|Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time|
|Source: Philosophical Studies 99 (2000): 129−166|
|Paper - Abstract|
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I examine the issue of persistence over time in the context of the special theory of relativity (SR). The four-dimensional ontology of perduring objects is clearly favored by SR. But it is a different question if and to what extent this ontology is required, and the rival endurantist1 ontology ruled out, by this theory. In addressing this question, I take the essential idea of endurantism2, that objects are wholly present at single moments of time, and argue that it commits one to unacceptable conclusions regarding coexistence, in the context of SR. I then propose and discuss a plausible account of coexistence for perduring objects, which is free of these defects. This leaves the endurantist3 room for some manoeuvres. I consider them and show that they do not really help the endurantist4 out. She can accommodate the notion of coexistence in the relativistic framework only at the cost of renouncing central endurantist5 intuitions.
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