When Is Death Bad for the One Who Dies?
Bradley (Ben)
Source: Nous, 38:1 (2004) 1–28
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’s argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and Neil Feit.

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