|Lewisian Realism: Methodology, Epistemology, and Circularity|
|Cameron (Ross P.)|
|Source: Synthese (A slightly shorter version of this paper is forthcoming …)|
|Paper - Abstract|
In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal1 Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian realism — the modal2 irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection — and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall victim to the objection I lay against Lewis.
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