The Two Dimensional Content of Consciousness
Prosser (Simon)
Source: Philosophical Studies (Forthcoming in …)
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker’s version of two-dimensional modal1 semantics.
  2. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition.
  3. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories.

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