Some Experienced Qualities Belong to the Experience
Raymont (Paul)
Source: Website; Oct 2005
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. A new criticism of representationalist views of consciousness is here proposed.
  2. Representational views are often supported by an appeal to a transparency thesis about conscious states, according to which an experience does not itself possess the qualities of which it makes one conscious. The experience makes one conscious of these qualities by representing them, not by instantiating them.
  3. Against this, it is argued that some of the properties of which one is conscious are had by the conscious state itself.
  4. Only by adopting this view can we account for certain perceptual incompatibilities, such as the fact that one cannot see a stick as being both bent and not bent. This sort of experience is impossible because it would require that an experience have, and not just represent, incompatible features.

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