The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson
Bostrom (Nick)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly, 2005, Vol. 55, No. 218, pp. 90-97
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my 'simulation argument'. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on 'grue'-like predicates.
Author’s Abstract
    My reply to Weatherson's paper ("Weatherson (Brian) - Are You a Sim?"). I argue he has misinterpreted the relevant indifference principle and that he has not provided any sound argument against the correct interpretation, nor has he addressed the arguments for this principle that I gave in the original paper. There also a few words on the difference between the Simulation Argument and traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and on so-called epistemological externalism.

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