Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account
Burke (Michael)
Source: Analysis 52, 1992, pp. 12-17
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Before us lies a copper statue1. In the same place, presumably, there is a piece of copper. What is the relationship between the statue2 and the piece of copper? The most popular account of such cases is one on which the statue3 and the piece of copper are numerically different objects even though they consist of just the same matter and are wholly present in just the same place. I argue that this account must be rejected. Elsewhere I offer a novel alternative.

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