|Max Black on the Identity of Indiscernibles|
|Cross (Charles B.)|
|Source: Philosophical Quarterly 45.180 (Jul. 1995), pp. 350-360|
|Paper - Abstract|
Philosophers Index Abstract
I give a critique of the argument against the Identity of Indiscernibles found in Max Black's dialogue "The Identity of Indiscernibles1". I begin by postulating and giving existence and individuation conditions for actually existent thought experiment2 characters on analogy with fictional characters as postulated in Peter van Inwagen's "Creatures of Fiction3". I then show that Black's two-spheres thought experiment4 raises not one but two discernibility questions:
Footnote 1: See "Black (Max) - The Identity of Indiscernibles".
Footnote 3: See "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Creatures of Fiction".
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