<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Baylis (Charles A.) - Review Article: The Identity of Indiscernibles (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6454.htm">Review Article: The Identity of Indiscernibles</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Baylis (Charles A.).htm">Baylis (Charles A.)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Journal of Symbolic Logic 21.1 (Mar. 1956), pp. 85-86</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6454.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PapersToNotes_6454.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Review of:- <ul type="disc"><li><a name="4"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1986.htm">Black (Max) - The Identity of Indiscernibles</A>", </li><li><a name="5"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6450.htm">Bergmann (Gustav) - The Identity of Indiscernibles and the Formalist Definition of 'Identity'</A>", </li><li><a name="6"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6451.htm">Wilson (N.L.) - The Identity of Indiscernibles and the Symmetrical Universe</A>", </li><li><a name="7"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6082.htm">Ayer (A.J.) - The Identity of Indiscernibles</A>", </li><li><a name="8"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20059.htm">O'Connor (D.J.) - The Identity of Indiscernibles</A>",</li><li><a name="9"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6446.htm">Rescher (Nicholas) - The Identity of Indiscernibles: A Reinterpretation</A>", </li><li><a name="10"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6439.htm">Pears (David) - The Identity of Indiscernibles</A>". </li></ul><BR><U>Full Text</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>Despite the varied authors and approaches the articles of this group build up to a considerable measure of agreement: <ol type="1"><li>The principle of the <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_81.htm">identity of indiscernibles</A><SUP>1</SUP> is philosophically uninteresting unless it is taken as necessary. </li><li>Two reasonably correct statements of the principle are as follows: <ol type="a"><li>If two objects are numerically different there is at least one property possessed by one of them that is not possessed by the other. </li><li>There cannot be mere numerical difference without qualitative difference (i.e., difference in some quality, property, or relation.) </ol></li><li>Unless certain relational properties, e.g. identity and difference, are excluded by a suitable restriction the principle becomes trivially true. </li><li>A suitable restriction is provided by the requirement that nothing is to count as a property unless it can be specified in general descriptive terms without the use of any references to individuals. </li><li>If this qualification is put in it seems to be possible to conceive of consistent universes in which the principle is contingently false, e.g., <ol type="a"><li>a radially symmetric universe, </li><li>a universe entirely composed of an infinite series of qualitatively identical sounds. </ol></li><li>In such universes it is impossible to distinguish the qualitatively identical things in purely predicative terms. </li><li>The above principle, namely (6), is itself trivial. </li><li>Even in a universe such as one described in (5), it would be possible to distinguish qualitatively identical items by non-descriptive individual reference expressions such as "This" and "That." </li></ol></li><li>Noteworthy additions or departures from this general agreement are the following: <ol type="1"><li>Bergmann distrusts appeals to what can and cannot be conceived, and holds that an adequate explication of 'analytic' can be given which would show the principle of the <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_81.htm">identity of indiscernibles</A><SUP>2</SUP> to be analytic. </li><li>Ayer fears that the denial of the necessity of the principle rests on adherence to a belief in "bare" substances, and hence, though he finds no answer to Black's symmetrical universes, he is inclined to cling to the <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_81.htm">identity of indiscernibles</A><SUP>3</SUP>. </li><li>Wilson suggests an alternative to the restriction listed in (4) above, viz., Properties such as bearing R to Smith, and bearing R to Smith2, though numerically distinct are qualitatively identical. </li><li>O'Connor urges that the issues involved cannot be settled without developing a fairly full metaphysics, in- cluding satisfactory answers to the problems about the nature of space, time, proper- ties, relations, etc. </li><li>Rescher prefers to state the principle in terms of linguistic reference adequacy. But living natural languages, he agrees, can always be extended, presumably by adding a suitable individual referring expression, so that they are referentially adequate and can thus pick out any object in the intended domain of reference. </li></ol> </li></ul></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T06:46" pubdate>02/08/2018 06:46:34</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>