Human Persons: Numerical Identity and Essence
DeGrazia (David)
Source: DeGrazia - Human Identity and Bioethics, 2005, Chapter 2
Paper - Abstract

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Sections

  1. The Psychological View
    … 1.1 Locke’s Theory
    … 1.2 Parfit’s1 Innovations
    … 1.3 A Strong Connection To Some Everyday Practical Concerns
  2. Concerns About The Intuitive Case Method
  3. Why Take Essentialism Seriously?
  4. Essence-Based Challenges To The Psychological View
  5. A Strategy For Replying To These Challenges: The Constitution View2
  6. Critique Of The Constitution View3 As Developed By Baker
    … 6.1 The Newborn Problem
    … 6.2 A Problematic View of Personal Identity
    … 6.3 Conclusions about Baker’s Constitution View4
  7. The Biological Approach: Motivation, Concerns, Responses
    … 7.1 A Presumption Favoring a Biological View5
    … 7.2 Several Concerns about This Approach
    … … 7.2.1 The Transplant6 Intuition
    … … 7.2.2 The Corpse Problem
    … … 7.2.3 Two Persons Associated with One Human Animal7?
    … … 7.2.4 An Allegedly Poor Fit with the Practical Concerns Associated with Identity
    … … 7.2.5 Conclusion
  8. A Semibiological Alternative: Human Beings as a Partly Psychological Kind
  9. One More Alternative: Mind Essentialism
  10. Conclusion: Verdicts on 10 Thought Experiments8



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 8: Very interesting!


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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