Human Persons: Numerical Identity and Essence
DeGrazia (David)
Source: DeGrazia - Human Identity and Bioethics, 2005, Chapter 2
Paper - Abstract

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Sections

  1. The Psychological View
    • 1.1 Locke’s Theory
    • 1.2 Parfit’s1 Innovations
    • 1.3 A Strong Connection To Some Everyday Practical Concerns
  2. Concerns About The Intuitive Case Method
  3. Why Take Essentialism Seriously?
  4. Essence-Based Challenges To The Psychological View
  5. A Strategy For Replying To These Challenges: The Constitution View2
  6. Critique Of The Constitution View3 As Developed By Baker4
    • 6.1 The Newborn Problem
    • 6.2 A Problematic View of Personal Identity
    • 6.3 Conclusions about Baker’s Constitution View5
  7. The Biological Approach: Motivation, Concerns, Responses
    • 7.1 A Presumption Favoring a Biological View6
    • 7.2 Several Concerns about This Approach
      → 7.2.1 The Transplant7 Intuition
      → 7.2.2 The Corpse Problem
      → 7.2.3 Two Persons Associated with One Human Animal8?
      → 7.2.4 An Allegedly Poor Fit with the Practical Concerns Associated with Identity
      → 7.2.5 Conclusion
  8. A Semibiological Alternative: Human Beings9 as a Partly Psychological Kind
  9. One More Alternative: Mind Essentialism
  10. Conclusion10: Verdicts on 10 Thought Experiments11



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 10: Very interesting!


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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