Identity, What We Are, and the Definition of Death
DeGrazia (David)
Source: DeGrazia - Human Identity and Bioethics, 2005, Chapter 4
Paper - Abstract

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  1. Introduction to the Debate
  2. Critique of Appeals to Our Essence in Defense of the Higher-Brain Standard
  3. Critique of Appeals to Personal Identity in Defense of the Higher-Brain Standard
  4. Can Appeal to Narrative Identity1 Support the Higher-Brain View?
  5. Might Death be a Moral Concept That is Independent of Identity Theory?
  6. Where Should We Take the Organismic Conception?
    … 6.1 Against Brain Death2
    … 6.2 Updating the Traditional View
    … 6.3 Why Not Disaggregate Death into a Process?
  7. Some Comments on Policy Options
    … 7.1 A Daring Policy Approach
    … 7.2 Conscience-Based Exemptions – On Either Approach
    … 7.3 A More Cautious Policy Approach – and Conclusion

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