Locke on Identity: The Scheme of Simple and Compound Things
Bolton (Martha Brandt)
Source: Barber (Kenneth F.) & Gracia (Jorge J.E.) - Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy (Descartes to Kant), 1994, pp. 103-132
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperDisclaimer


  1. Locke’s Perspectives on the Topic of Individuation1
  2. Individuation2 at a Moment
  3. ‘Such as is the Idea … Such Must Be the Identity’
  4. Simple versus Compounded Material Things
  5. Persons as Compounded Things
  6. Conclusion

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - May 2019. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page