Functionalism and self-consciousness
McCullagh (Mark)
Source: Mind and Language 15, 2000, pp. 481-499
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. I offer a philosophically well-motivated work-around for a problem that "Bealer (George) - Self-Consciousness" (1997) has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism.
  2. The problem concerns how to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental predicates occur within the scopes of other mental predicates.
  3. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness1 identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could play within creatures whose psychology is less complex than her own.

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