Experience, Agency, and Personal Identity
Schechtman (Marya)
Source: Paul, Miller & Paul - Personal Identity, 2005
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. Psychologically based accounts of personal identity over time start from a view of persons as experiencing subjects. Derek Parfit1 argues that if such an account is to justify the importance we attach to identity it will need to provide a deep unity of consciousness2 throughout the life of a person, and no such unity is possible.
  2. In response, many philosophers have switched to a view of persons as essentially agents, arguing that the importance of identity depends upon agential unity rather than unity of consciousness3. While this shift contributes significantly to the discussion, it does not offer a fully satisfying alternative. Unity of consciousness4 still seems required if identity is to be as important as we think it is.
  3. Views of identity based on agential unity do, however, point to a new understanding of unity of consciousness5 which meets Parfit6's challenge, yielding an integrated view of identity which sees persons as both subjects and agents.

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