Personal Identity and Post-Mortem Survival
Braude (Stephen)
Source: Paul, Miller & Paul - Personal Identity, 2005
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperColour-ConventionsDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. The so-called “problem of personal identity” can be viewed as either a metaphysical or an epistemological issue. Metaphysicians want to know what it is for one individual to be the same person as another. Epistemologists want to know how to decide if an individual is the same person as someone else.
  2. These two problems converge around evidence from mediumship and apparent reincarnation1 cases, suggesting personal survival of bodily death and dissolution. These cases make us wonder how it might be possible for a person to survive death and either temporarily or permanently animate another body. And they make us wonder how we could decide if such postmortem survival has actually occurred.
  3. In this essay
    • I argue, first, that metaphysical worries about postmortem survival are less important than many have supposed.
    • Next, I'll consider briefly why cases suggesting postmortem survival can be so intriguing and compelling, and I'll survey our principal explanatory options and challenges.
    • Then, I'll consider why we need to be circumspect in our appraisal of evidence for mind-body correlations.
    • And finally, I'll try to draw a few tentative and provocative conclusions.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Sept 2020. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page