Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience
Sider (Ted)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66, 2003, 139-149
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Author’s Abstract

    A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical supervenience1 by Trenton Merricks. The argument assumes that consciousness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic.

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