Moment Universals and Personal Identity
Zuboff (Arnold)
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52, 1978, 141-55
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

    In this paper I argue, regretfully, that we are not really persons. First I show through a series of thought experiments1 that each moment of experience, in all its subjective detail, is a distinct universal, numerically as well as qualitatively the same wherever it is instantiated and in no strong sense belonging to any one body, mind or series of moments. But each of us takes himself to be a person, ie., a being whose future experience coheres strongly and uniquely with his present (hence our disturbance at hypothetical cases of human fission). I conclude that this mistaken belief is a product of evolution, as the basis of concern in the organism.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Jan 2020. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page