Split-Brains and Singular Personhood
Greenwood (John)
Source: Southern Journal of Philosophy 31.3, 1993, 285-306
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    In this paper it is argued that the experimental data on commissurotomy1 patients provide no grounds for denying the singular personhood of commissurotomy2 patients. This is because, contrary to most philosophical accounts, there is no "unity of consciousness3" discriminating condition for singular personhood that is violated in the case of commissurotomy4 patients, and because no contradictions arise when singular personhood is ascribed to commissurotomy5 patients. Introduction; 1. Commissurotomy6 and Its Consequences; 2. Personhood, Singular Personhood, and Unity of Consciousness7; 3. Singular Personhood and Folk Psychological Explanation; 4. Singular Personhood and Knowledge Attribution; 5. Cognitive Access

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