Personal Identity and Rationality
Parfit (Derek)
Source: Synthese, Vol. 53, No. 2, Matters of the Mind (Nov., 1982), pp. 227-241
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briefly describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality.
  2. This conception I shall call "Classical Prudence". I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible.

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