From Explanation to Causation
Pietroski (Paul)
Source: Pietroski - Causing Actions, 2000, Chapter 3
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Causation1 is (primarily) a description-insensitive relation between events, while explanation is a description-sensitive relation between facts, which (for these purposes) can be identified with true Fregean thoughts.
  2. Events are thus individuated more coarsely than facts, which are the senses of true sentences. But given the event analysis defended in Ch. 1, some facts are about particular events. And if a fact about one event explains a fact about another event, then the first event is a cause for the second.

Sections
  1. Explainers and Causes;
  2. Thoughts about Events;
  3. A Possible Account of Mental Causation2

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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