Natural Causes
Pietroski (Paul)
Source: Pietroski - Causing Actions, 2000, Chapter 7
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. The proposed account of causation1, in terms of explanation, does not sleight the mind-independence of causal relations.
  2. The relevant notion of explanation is objective, even if facts are taken to be abstract Fregean ‘modes of presenting’ (or ‘ways of thinking about’) events. Causation2 remains a natural, and often perceptible relation between spatiotemporal particulars. But we must resist empiricist conceptions of causation3.

Sections
  1. Avoiding Projectivism;
  2. The Extension of Causation4;
  3. Forms of Causation5;
  4. Concluding Remarks

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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