On What There Isn't
Priest (Stephen)
Source: Priest - Towards Non-Being, 2005, Chapter 5
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryText Colour-Conventions


Philosophers Index Abstract

    The major problem for a Meinongian theory of objects is to account for the properties that nonexistent objects have. In particular, objects cannot have all the properties that they are characterized as having, on pain of triviality. This paper suggests a solution to this problem. Nonexistent objects do have all those properties they are characterized as having, but not at this world: at the worlds that realize the way things are according to the representation of the cognitive agent who thinks about, or in other ways cognizes, the object. A formal model of this account is given, and some of its consequences explored.
Author’s Abstract
    Chapter 5 provides a discussion of Quine and Russell on non-existent objects. Their arguments aim to show that Meinong’s notion of such objects is incoherent. Quine’s well known argument about the fat man in the doorway is discussed and rejected.
Contents
  1. Introduction: Quine's Critique;
  2. Russell's Meinongianism;
  3. Russell's Critique of Meinong;
  4. On What There Is;
  5. The Possible Fat Man in the Doorway;
  6. Conclusion

Comment:

Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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