The Case Against
Haggqvist (Soren)
Source: Haggqvist - Thought Experiments In Philosophy, 1996, Chapter 1
Paper - Abstract

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Sections

  1. An epistemological puzzle?
  2. Scepticism about thought experiments1
  3. Wilkes against philosophical thought experiments2
    • 3.1 The underspecificity objection
    • 3.2 The natural kinds3 objection
    • 3.3 Theoretically impossible assumptions
  4. Criticism of Wilkes;
  5. Fodor: there is no saying what we would say
  6. Quine: what we should say is indeterminate
  7. Dancy: counterfactual cases can't decide actual cases
    • 7.1 Moral reasons and properties
    • 7.2 How Dancy's criticism covers actual cases too
    • 7.3 On Dancy's notion of a holism of reasons
    • 7.4 How holism is compatible with the relevance of new cases
  8. Summary

Comment:

Photocopy of complete book; Filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 07 (H)".

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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